Talk:Hans von Seeckt

Untitled

http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/mil/html/mh_047300_seeckthansvo.htm

Jewish Background of His Wife

According to this PDF document his wife was adopted by a Jewish family: kudiglib.ku.edu/projects/rigg_bm.pdf. However, I'm unable to find any confirmation of that fact, and I think it needs better verification. Anybody have any additional info on this one? It seems like the kind of thing that should belong in his WP bio if true....

Basis for the claim that: 'Von Seeckt disciplined this small army much differently than past German armies.'?

The (unreferenced) claims made in the section on the training of the Weimar Reichswehr, sounds anachronistic in the portrayal of German army punitive regime during the Empire.

While I am aware of several accounts of harsh disciplining (the beatings and shootings mentioned in the section) in the context of the Prussian Army of Frederick the Great's age, as far as I know, the German Imperial Army was not particularly known for harsh punishment. To the best of my knowledge, in WW1 among the major powers it was the British, and even more so the Italians,* who used executions for "cowardice" (which could be "shell chock" i.e. ptsd or "battle fatigue") very liberally in contrast to both the Germans and the French.

And referring back to the Frederickian system is anachronistic here, because all "modern" European armies of that age were run on a similar regime of harsh corporeal punishment with the ultimate threat of capital punishment.

(*)I'm unfamiliar with the Russian WW1 military punishment system, so they might have to be included as well) Mojowiha (talk) 11:04, 12 March 2011 (UTC)

Removed Section

I have removed the following:

"Seeckt made the training standards of the Reichswehr the toughest in the world. Von Seeckt trained them in anti-air and anti-tank battles by creating wooden weapons and staging mock battles under the guise of training the soldiers for reintroduction into civilian life. Von Seeckt disciplined this small army much differently than past German armies. Rather than beat or shoot soldiers for infractions, Von Seeckt forced minor offenders to spend off-hour duties lying under a bed and singing old Lutheran hymns. The Chief also had his men taught in seemingly useless topics like horse anatomy and the art of beekeeping to allow them to be citizens with skills as well as military support crews.

Seeckt has been critiziced for his training the Reichswehr to fight wars in the distant future rather than training them for possible wars in the present. Seeckt saw the Reichswehr as detached from politics, neither promoting or denying the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic. Seeckt saw the Reichswehr as a way to train the army for the future, not as a means to protect Germany while it was under threat of invasion by Czechoslovakia and Poland. As a result little effort was prepared for war plans should either nation have invaded; Seeckt preferred to train his armies to fight in a mechanized environment that could not exist until Germany rearmed. Seeckt's logic was that eventually Germany would violate Versaille and rearm and he prepared for that, and although that proved correct, he endangered Germany at the time by not preparing for contigencies in the present. After Seeckt left the Reicshwehr in 1926, far more effort was paid to preparing the Reichswehr in fighting the potential enemies in the present using equipment already available to the Reichswehr".

Besides for being unsourced, this is rather POVish with all this page about Germany in danger of an attack from Poland or Czechoslovakia. Nobody was planning to attack Germany in the 1920s-30s, so thus Seeckt did not put Germany in any danger. The only reason why the above was added seems to be an effort at moral equivalence, in that Seeckt's plans for aggression against Poland are contrasted with the danger of Germany that was alleged to have faced in the 1920s of Polish aggression. So seen in this light, Seeckt's unwillingess to accept Poland and his repeated calls to partition Poland with the Soviet Union seems more reasonable than what in fact the case. Note also the way in which Seeckt's plans for aggression is presented in such a way as to suggest that Germany was the victim. Germany was put was "endangered" by plans for offensive warfare, but there is nothing about Poles or Czechoslovaks being "endangered". The fact that Seeckt did not see the need to draw plans for a defensive war with either Poland or Czechoslovakia might had something to do with the fact that there was no danger of Germany being invaded by those countries. To repeat, nobody in the interwar era was planning on attacking Germany, and all the plans for aggression came from the German side, so this is really an effort to promote immoral equivalence.--A.S. Brown (talk) 01:11, 9 July 2011 (UTC) Marshal Piłsudski, the Polish strongman leader, militarily faced down German brinkmanship in Danzig in very well documented incidents in 1932 and 1933 and in March 1933 sent Jerzy Potocki to speak directly with the French prime minister about a pre-emptive war against Hitler. Earlier, in 1931, the Polish ambassador told the US president that "Revisionism means war" when sounded out about changes to Poland's borders (the Corridor). Hence, to say that "nobody in the interwar era was planning on attacking Germany" is totally wrong. Oh, I forgot to say - the Poles offered to attack Germany in 1936 over the remilitarization of the Rhineland, but the French told them not to. Sourceshttp://josephpilsudski.com/preventive-war-against-hitler_302.html And every single decent history of central Europe in the 1930s.

Kapp putsch

I have reverted some rather misleading statements about Seeckt and the Kapp putsch, where Seeckt's open refusal to obey orders is presented very misleadingly as part of an effort to the military out of politics. First thing, Seeckt had no problem about ordering the Army into action against the Communists. In April 1920-a month after the Kapp putsch of March 1920-Seeckt crushed a Communist uprising in the Rhineland. No problem with obeying orders there when the enemy was on the left. If were true that Seeckt only refused to obey orders during the Kapp putsch to keep the Army non-political, then the same should had applied with the Communist uprising. Second, it is true that Weimar constitution said that officers were supposed to be apolitical, but it also said the President was the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and no-one does it say about officers having the right to pick and chose one orders to obey. Anyhow, one should not take the formal distribution of power under the constitution too literally. Officially yes, the military was under the control of the politicians. Unofficially, the "state within the state" status of the military meant it was not. A perfect example is when Seeckt ordered in 1920 that no Jews could join the Reichswehr no matter how qualified they might be, which was in total violation of the constitution which banned religious discrimination. Third, the phrase "state within the state" means that the military was not under control of the politicians, not the military was "isolated" from politics. Clausewitz famously declared that war is the continuation by other means. Thus the decision to start a war is always political. Seeckt's starting talks with the Soviet Union on the subject of partitioning Poland-which did not even bother to inform Ebert or any other politician of until two years later-was thus a highly political act. Some "isolation" from politics! Fourth, the POVish nature of the argument can be seen that the line "The same officers who violated the Reichswehreid during the Kapp putsch by disobying Ebert's orders to suppress the putsch were later to claim that the Hitler oath made it impossible for them to resist the Nazi regime." German officers always claimed that oaths were sacred to them and could never be broken, but in fact, these officers were very selective when it came to oaths; a oath to defend democracy could broken at a whim, but an oath to a genocidal dictatorship was sacred and could never be broken. The same officers broke the Reichswehreid in 1920 because they did not believe in democracy and by contrast did believe in Hitler.--A.S. Brown (talk) 02:44, 30 October 2013 (UTC)

I’ve read the book A genius for war: the German army and general staff which claims that seeckt’s deeds during the Putsch have been put out of context and that in reality his political manoeuvring and such caused the failure of the Putsch. It claims he first warned the civilian government about the danger of people like Lüttwitz and Kapp well before the Putsch was to take place but his warnings were ignored because Seeckt also told that Lüttwitz’s staff didn’t support a Putsch and that there was infighting between Kapp and Lüttwitz. When the entente allies decided to charge many military and civilian leaders with war crimes, even those who clearly didn’t commit any, and demanded the demobilisation of the free crops Lüttwitz gained enough motivation and support to immediately execute his coup plans. Before the Putsch Seeckt had specifically demobilised those units who he knew would take part in it which ironically was Lüttwitz reason for going ahead with his plans immediately. Next the book claims that Seeckt’s during the Putsch have often been misrepresented and oversimplified. He didn’t order troops to Berlin because before the Putsch occurred the government wouldn’t give permission for such actions while during the Putsch when he was called upon by Noske and Ebert he wanted Noske to give the order in order to put the army under firm control of the government, as such he didn’t act himself but as the others saw the need for such actions now and were in a position to do it themselves they were supposed to act instead. He was afraid commanders would think it was a military counter-coup if he himself gave such orders. He wanted the Putsch to end with those committing it noticing the army was still loyal to the government and giving up without a military confrontation, which could lead to civil war, taking place. He did take a look at the Berlin garrison to asses their strength but came to the conclusion that it was too weak to resist Lüttwitz. The local police, security and garrison commanders were also semi-openly loyal to Lüttwitz and would probably rather join his forces than fight them. His response to Noske requesting support in defending the capital was refused because he thought the troops would join the Putsch and not defeat it but this is often interpreted as being disloyalty, as refusing to aid the civilian government. Most sources imply the interaction between the men stopped after that and that Seeckt went on leave but do not state that explicitly. The book claims that other sources show a much longer conversation. He told Noske, who accused him of wanting to leave and join the rebels, what he taught would happen if they defended Berlin. All present except of some officers, suspected co-conspirators of Lüttwitz, agreed with Seeckt who left the conference to immediately send messengers to the corps commanders that they should only obey the civilian government and no high military authority. While this put the rest of the army outside of the reach of the conspirators it also put it outside of the reach of Seeckt who officially resigned his position. He did sent officers in civilian clothes to the civilian government to assist them in their operations. In this way the well-prepared and aware Seeckt put the full strength of the army outside the conspirators reach while instilling loyalty to the civilian government in them, at least that’s what the book claims. This also explains why he did make moves against the communists as they weren’t about to occupy Berlin and they didn’t have suspected supporters in the high command like Kapp and Lüttwitz. In the book Seeckt’s actions aren’t portrayed as being in line with the politics and the army being split but instead as uniting the democratic government and the army more than ever before in Germany. The state is portrayed as the thing he is primary loyal to, not s certain ideology which could be misinterpreted as him acting in line with the principle of the military state within state but is shown by the book to be the exact opposite.

It is not the newest of books, maybe new evidence has come to light recently, but regardless I think it best to just add a separate Kapp Putsch section detailing both strains of thought. If others who know more about the pro-Putsch Seeckt narrative agree and could add that strain of thought I could begin editing. Dorromikhal (talk) 13:31, 10 July 2019 (UTC)

Hans von Seeckt Kaserne, Celle

I have added a small detail to the lede. Hans von Seeckt Kaserne: Having a large barracks named after him was an important salute by the Third Reich to his political and military career and antisemitism. (Possible COI?: I was stationed in Trenchard Barracks from 1974 to 1977). Kudpung กุดผึ้ง (talk) 00:38, 11 October 2020 (UTC)