Talk:Panic of 1837

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POV cause does not cite accurate source[edit]

The following sentence is not properly sourced and is a distraction to the article: "It should be noted, however, that most mainstream academic economists in the United States do not accept all of the conclusions of the Austrian school." Seems evident the intent of this sentence is discredit the Jacksonin democrat theory. (What is the definition of a mainstream economist, anyway? Which specific 'mainstream' economist(s) does not accept the theory? And why does that matter here?). Furthermore, the cited material is relevant to the article but does not support the claim. This sentence should be omitted. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.194.216.173 (talk) 05:24, 17 January 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Causes should be edited[edit]

Reference to Austrian School theory is little accepted outside of strident libertarian circles, and mention of such fringe theory puts the entire article in question. (Really, does EVERYTHING on the internet need comment from Ron Paul supporters?) The citation of Mexican bimetalism doesn't make sense -- wouldn't it have pushed gold out of circulation? That's what Greshem's Law says. Einsteingreco (talk) 06:47, 22 April 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Effects and Aftermath Page Needs to be Rewritten[edit]

It seems that economists have made numerous mistakes in the aftermath of the Panic of 1837 by not correcting GNP numbers for deflation. I already posted a quote from economist and de facto historian Murray Rothbard that GNP, when corrected for deflation, actually increased from 1838 to 1843.

I saved the new edited version:

According to most historical accounts, the economy did not recover until 1843.[1] Most economists also agree that there was a brief recovery from 1838 to 1839, which then ended as the Bank of England and Dutch creditors raised interest rates. [2] However, economic historian Peter Temin has argued that, when corrected for deflation, the economy actually grew after 1838.[3] According to economist and historian Murray Rothbard, between 1839 and 1843, real consumption increased by 21 percent and real gross national product increased by 16 percent, despite the fact that real investment fell by 23 percent and the money supply shrank by 34 percent.[4] Apparently, the economy was able to grow due to price flexibility, a result of minimum union control and no government intervention.[5]

References

  1. ^ http://thehistorybox.com/ny_city/panics/panics_article6a.htm
  2. ^ Milton Friedman, and Anna J. Scwartz. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. pg. 10
  3. ^ Dr. Peter Temin. The Jacksonian Economy. pg 155
  4. ^ Murray Rothbard. History of Money and Banking. pg. 102. http://mises.org/books/historyofmoney.pdf
  5. ^ ibid pg. 102
I have clarified that Murray Rothbard is an Austrian economist. Austrian economics is not well-viewed by actual economists, and Wikipedia itself notes that it is heterodox. I have also removed the claim that he is a historian, because that falsely leads the reader to assume he has some credentials in that regard (you yourself qualify the term here with *de facto*, but did not do the same in the article I notice). Anyway, I have left Rothbard's claim as is for now, but I would feel much better if the same claim came from an orthodox economic historian.Eniagrom (talk) 03:42, 15 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Old talk page post[edit]

Needs some vulgarity cleaning at the ends of the two major sections Paragraph one - I believe 'specie' is not (paper money) - this clouds the entire artoicle. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 24.98.229.38 (talk) 15:37, 28 November 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Wikisource the Shepard text[edit]

As I said, a text dump does not belong in an article, articles that were started from other sources notwithstanding -- this is ancillary and redundant material to say the least. (An article that needs a "narrative history" is not a good article.) More problematically, it violates WP:NPOV and WP:ATT (some of these claims will be impossible to properly source). It is better that we put this public-domain text on Wikisource, and cite it as a reference. -- Dhartung | Talk 21:26, 17 March 2007 (UTC)[reply]

It's also rubbish, from an economics POV. The author does not understand economics and his explanations are simply incorrect. This material does not belong in a wiki article. Toby Douglass 07:56, 5 September 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Claiming a central bank would have alleviated the money supply contraction that lead to the Panic of 1837 is fallacy. It was the powerful Bank of England stock holders and their American lackeys retaliating against the Jackson administration for not renewing the charter of the privately held Second Bank of the United States that led to the panic through a massive and orchestrated restriction of the money supply.

The bank was formed in 1816. It was capitalized by the US government depositing 20% of the assets. The bank board members then lent themselves the funds to purchase the remaining 80% of the shares using fractional reserve banking. Thus with no cash investments, the bank directors began issuing treasury bonds, collecting the interest and manipulating the money supply to their advantage and the advantage of their English banking patrons such as Nathaniel Rothschild. Jackson fought against and ended the banks charter due to money supply manipulation and massive corruption.

This is incorrect. Nathaniel Rothschild hated the US bank because it represented US industrial interests against his British ones. Your stating typical Jewish talking points. Shame on you. Jackson's "pet banks" were supported by fathers of Wall Street in New York. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.30.183.129 (talk) 10:43, 26 January 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Central banks have a proven economic history of money supply manipulation to enrich the private share holders of these organizations. The boom and bust "Business Cycles" that central banks are claimed to prevent are actually prevalent under central banking systems. They are almost always named in a deceitful manner to give the appearance of being a government institution, i.e. The Federal Reserve, The Bank of England, etc.UC-kid 16:38, 15 October 2007 (UTC)[reply]

This is incorrect. It was the Bank of England that pushed Jackson to get rid of the national US bank so they could control US money supply through their Rothschild/Astor handler. Jackson was a known British supporter as were all southerners. It was the Rothschilds who triggered the revolutionary war through forcing specie on the colonial scrip and after Jackson comes to power, shows up in American records for the first time. Your stating a lie. Abolish your post. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.30.183.129 (talk) 10:40, 26 January 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Seriously, is there any reason not to delete the Shepard text dump?Cromulant (talk) 00:05, 19 August 2011 (UTC)[reply]

For the reasons mentioned above (clear POV, redundancy, inaccuracy) I have removed the Shepard text. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.231.215.198 (talk) 19:43, 15 November 2011 (UTC)[reply]

American Bias[edit]

The financial crises occured in the Canadian colonies of Upper Canada and Lower Canada as well collapsing the meek banking system that was still in its infancy. It had financial effects which lie at the heart of the rebellions in Upper and Lower Canada in 1838. I would appreciate at least SOME mention of this. 65.95.241.195 16:54, 6 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Ditto the effect on Texas in its attempts to secure European loans. -LlywelynII (talk) 10:06, 11 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Cartoon Useless[edit]

The "Whig cartoon showing unemployment" is too hard to read and seems to lend nothing to the article. Maybe it's just my eyes? -65.169.210.66 19:27, 29 August 2007 (UTC)[reply]

It's readable if it's full size, but as it's shrunken down in the article, no one can read it. It does lend something to the article, however, because it exemplifies the Whig point of view at that time. Alexanderaltman (talk) 03:24, 18 October 2009 (UTC)[reply]
It's not just your eyes and even enlarged it's pretty illegible. Contra Alex above, it doesn't add the Whig POV since it doesn't seem to blame anyone (unless the New Era broadsheet and wall silhouette are supposed to add context, in which case they need clarification.) Atm, it is just an unemployed man with his complaining dependents.


On the other hand, it is better than nothing, until a better cartoon, portraits of principle actors, or wildcat currency images are added. -LlywelynII (talk) 10:10, 11 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Speculation section removed[edit]

The earlier version's explanation of land speculation helped convey the mechanics of the collapse. Why was it removed? it should be put back in. Right now, the article is simply uninformative -- a panic happened, Van Buren got blamed. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 38.105.214.33 (talk) 23:56, 23 January 2008 (UTC)[reply]

"British Central Bank"?[edit]

The Causes section refers several times to the "British Central Bank". Is this the institution usually known as the Bank of England? If it is, why not give it its usual name? Maproom (talk) 23:09, 29 September 2008 (UTC)[reply]


Needs Rewrite[edit]

The theory that reserve rates remained relatively stable in the 1830s seems to ignore the fact that these rates were set by state governments and enforcement was very uneven. John Kenneth Galbraith described the resulting situation in "The Age of Uncertainty" (p. 184):

"The smaller local banks were to remain free from serious restraint in many of the states for a century. Once Biddle's hand had been lifted, these state banks exploded in number. To have a bank in the eighteen-thirties became, almost literally, a human right. Many were well managed. But for many the more remote the cross-roads, the deeper the forest, the more desolate the swamp, the more attractive the location. For a remote or obscure address diminished the likelihood that the notes issued by the bank would ever find their way back for collection. There was state regulation, but it was far from reliable. In Michigan, where the history is better than elsewhere, the banks were required to maintain a reserve of gold and silver against their notes. Boxes of coins were sent around through the forest just in front of the commissioners who were sent out to enforce the law. As an act of economy, a thin layer of gold was once found to be covering a thick deposit of broken glass. In conservative Massachusetts in these years a bank failed. Against notes of $500,000 outstanding, it had cash reserves of $86.48. By the time of the Civil War some 7000 different kinds of bank notes were in circulation in the United States; to these, numerous artists with access to a printing press had added another 5000 that were counterfeit. Legal or bonus, the purchasing power was often about the same, meaning null."

The article should be re-written to mention the lack of a stable currency following the collapse of the Second Bank of the United States. The theory that proliferation of dubious currency had no effect on the speculative bubble is unproven and should not be included.

--Forrest Johnson (talk) 21:09, 10 November 2008 (UTC)[reply]

Panic of 1837[edit]

It certainly gives the impression to me (formerly taught at the university level) of plagiarism with lengthy quotes in no way, at least directly, acknowledged. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Pstraten (talkcontribs) 15:51, 4 April 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Blatant POV[edit]

"Of course, the initial Government intervention in the market had been part of the cause of the problem ..." What do we mean, "Of course"? Is this a matter of natural law, like the sun rising in the east? If so, shouldn't it at least be cited? This really needs to be toned down, even if it involves adding weasel words. NewEnglandYankee (talk) 02:30, 19 April 2009 (UTC)[reply]

That entire phrase - not just the "of course" - reads like a Republican manifesto, especially in light of the 2008-2009 economic picture and government efforts to confront the situation. It might be that the writer means that the government's specie policy caused the problem, but that isn't what the sentence says. Unless someone can provide a credibly neutral source to support that statement, it ought to be removed. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 69.248.182.167 (talk) 21:59, 22 April 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Explanation for edit[edit]

Reading the article, I was struck by the mention of Mexican bimetallism and the citation of Gresham's law as an explanation for the flow of Mexican silver to the north, since Gresham's law would have predicted a northward flow of gold and, if anything, a southward flow of silver in response to bimetallism. Reading the text by Murray Rothbard cited in the article though, I learned that Mexico at the time did not adopt bimetallism (in the usual sense of a linked silver and gold standard) but instead issued debased copper coinage. Marco polo (talk) 19:24, 20 November 2012 (

Paragraph one - I believe Specie is not (paper money) - makes the article seem, well wrong! Mike24.98.229.38 (talk) 15:40, 28 November 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Significant POV of a single person[edit]

_____________________________ This page has been edited by Stephen W. Campbell as mentioned below. Which does signify his special interest in this page. The reason why I am leaving this here is because this article could possibly have one man's strong opinion (For no self interest necessarily)

http://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-history/may-2014/improving-wikipedia — Preceding unsigned comment added by Debasish Dey (talkcontribs) 14:07, 10 May 2014 (UTC)[reply]

the allegations of POV are false, insulting and in violation of WP:BLP rules. Debasish Dey invented claims of POV and has been unable to provide a single example. Rjensen (talk) 14:34, 21 May 2014 (UTC)[reply]
  • Perhaps without intent, Dey has pointed out an excellent example of what Wikipedia is all about. Because Mr. Campbell's contributions this article is in much better shape. Moreover, his openness about the way he went about it, is not simply what we would want from all editors, but is also an example of how to improve an article while also respecting other people's contributions. It is exactly because of this approach that I do not see any significant POV here. The other way around. The editor made sure his views will not overtake his editing, which is what we all should do. Historian (talk) 15:39, 23 June 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Capitalization of headings[edit]

I just reverted what I assume was a good-faith effort at improving the article by capitalizing "Aftermath" in the subheading, "Effects and aftermath." The WP MoS requires sentence-style capitalization of headings. Yopienso (talk) 01:05, 23 May 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Fixed minor vandalism[edit]

There was a minor vandalism in the first line of the article. "Panic! of 1837" was changed to "Panic of 1837" I believe it may have been in one other place but I could not find it in edit mode. If there was a reason for this please feel free to change it back. This may have been done by a bot, but I don't have time to check the edit history right now. Guy who couldn't get a username (talk) 19:54, 16 January 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Sounds like a prank based on https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panic!_at_the_Disco I don't think they exclaimed it like that back in 1937 though. Popish Plot (talk) 19:26, 19 June 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Recession or Depression?[edit]

Both terms are used in the article. From what I have read most economists and historians use the term "depression." But whichever term is employed we should work towards uniformity. -Ad Orientem (talk) 02:17, 10 May 2019 (UTC)[reply]

The slave economy[edit]

I don't know how to edit Wikipedia well, so here is a summary of some needed edits. The role of the slave economy in the crises of 1837 and 1839 is mostly ignored in the article. This is significant because:

  • The vast majority of cotton production in the Southern US was through slave labor.
  • Huge increases in the quantity and productivity of slave labor contributed to the preceding increases in cotton production and stagnation in cotton prices.
  • Along with land, the primary asset of most enslavers was their slaves. Enslavers were highly leveraged in part because of their ability to mortgage their slaves to raise capital for expending their operations.
  • Leading up to the panic of 1837, slave prices were still climbing quickly even when cotton prices stopped climbing, breaking the pattern of the prior years in which slave prices were very closely tied to the price of cotton.
  • Following the panic, when banks tried to collect on their debts owed by the enslavers, what that meant in practice was often auctioning off slaves, and slave prices dropped precipitously.

This is laid out in detail in pages 270-280 of [1] To support others in editing, here is a too-large quote from this source:

For decades before the financial crisis of 2008, most economists dogmatically insisted that the behavior of the market and its actors was inevitably rational. Yet a few brave souls insisted that the history of bubbles, booms, and crashes showed a clear historical record of mass irrational economic behavior. Throughout history, in fact, when three conditions occur at the same time, an asset bubble—irrationally high prices for some category of asset—usually emerges. Thomas Harrison was observing all three. The first such condition is the elimination of market regulation. By 1836, Jackson’s administration had destroyed the B.U.S., and replaced it with nothing. Nor did states try to control how much money banks printed and lent. Meanwhile, the national Whig Party, once the champion of the B.U.S., now tried to eliminate regulation altogether by passing the Deposit Act of 1836. This act shifted public land revenues from western banks to eastern ones, allowing the latter to increase their lending. The Whigs also doubled the number of pet banks. 19

Lending by US banks had also increased dramatically since 1833 because of the second cause of bubbles: financial innovations that make it easier to expand the leverage of borrowers. C.A.P.L.-style bonds provided distant in- vestors with opportunity to purchase shares in the income flows of thousands of slaves—to speculate, in effect, on future revenues generated by cotton and slaves. These securities drew cash into the southwestern region, inflating the value of all kinds of assets, especially enslaved “hands.”

But one more factor makes a bubble run wild, and that is the euphoric belief that the rules of economics have changed, that somehow “this time is different” and asset prices will not return to their mean. “We can see nothing in the prospects of the Country to make it likely that [positive forecasts] will be disappointed,” wrote merchants Byrne Hammond and Company in March

1836.

Moreover, the panic of 1839 was enabled by the Southern state banks agreeing to back new loans to enslavers after the panic of 1837. Here is another useful quote from Baptist (2016) on the aftermath of the panic of 1837:

Yet, “In Missi.[,] there has been no absolute loss of capital,” wrote Stephen Duncan. Enslavers still held the assets—the men, women, and children who produced the commodity around which the entire Atlantic financial economy revolved. But without enough credit to lubricate the circuits of American trade, bales made in 1837 might well sit on the levees and docks until the wind ripped their burlap wrappers into flags. So over the next twelve months, southern entrepreneurs asked investors to sink more long- term capital into their region, and to do so on the basis of slavery- backed securities. States and territories on slavery’s frontier issued at least $25 million in new bank debt, most of it state- backed, between 1837 and 1839. The world financial community responded. Alabama’s state bank attracted massive quantities of capital from the Rothschilds, perhaps the wealthiest family in the world, proprietors of a powerful merchant bank headquartered in London and Paris. The new issues of bank securities, in turn, allowed banks to loan out more money to southwestern borrowers. Which they did. By 1841, the residents of Mississippi would owe twice as much money—$48 million—to the state’s banks as they had at the beginning of 1837.

References

  1. ^ Baptist, E. E. (2016). The half has never been told: Slavery and the making of American capitalism. Hachette UK.