Work unit

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Not to be confused with Unit of work.
Not to be confused with Joule.

A work unit or danwei (simplified Chinese: 单位; traditional Chinese: 單位; pinyin: dān wèi) is the name given to a place of employment in the People's Republic of China. The term danwei remains in use today, as people still use it to refer to their workplace. However, it is more appropriate to use danwei to refer to a place of employment during the period when the Chinese economy was not as developed and more heavily reliant on welfare for access to long-term urban workers or when used in the context of state-owned enterprises. Prior to Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, a work unit acted as the first step of a multi-tiered hierarchy linking each individual with the central Communist Party infrastructure. Work units were the principal method of implementing party policy. The work unit provided lifetime employment and extensive socioeconomic welfare -- "a significant feature of socialism and a historic right won through the Chinese Revolution."[1]

Danwei system[edit]

Institutions such as industrial factories, schools and hospitals, and government departments are all part of the danwei system.[2] Among them, the heavy industrial work units, commonly viewed as the prototype of the socialist workplace, were granted priority for resources. During the Maoist era, the work unit served as multifunctional urban institutions that encompassed various aspects of urban livelihoods. Danwei contained facilities for work and daily living, including production facilities, offices, residential areas, social services, child-care facilities, dry goods stores, public toilets, bath houses, meeting rooms, clubs for retirees, and sports courts and fields.[3]: 310  Larger danwei might have schools or in-patient healthcare clinics.[3]: 310  Workers' benefits were only partly in the form of wages, with significant benefits coming in the form of state-provided services and the like.[4] Therefore, work units provided essential social resources to its members when the market economy had not yet fully developed. The industrial danwei was a state institution.[4]

Amongst other things, the work unit assigned individuals living quarters and provided them with food, which was eaten in centralized canteens. The danwei system was crucial to the implementation of the one child policy as the reproductive behaviour of workers could be monitored through the danwei system. Workers not complying with policy could have their pay docked, incentives withheld or living conditions downgraded.

Among the goals that state planners sought to advance through constructing danwei as part of China's urbanization was the development of a socialist citizenry with a proletarian consciousness.[5]: 24  In the danwei, urban Chinese lived and worked together in a collective and egalitarian environment.[5]: 59 

The increasing liberalization of China's economy led to state owned enterprises being put into competition with private enterprise and, increasingly, foreign multinational corporations. The "iron rice bowl", the policy of job security for large parts of the industrial workforce, continued to prevent work units from dismissing workers, while private enterprises were able to hire and fire workers as they saw fit. The decision by the central and provincial governments to offer tax and financial incentives to foreign investors in order to encourage them to invest in China led to further difficulties for the danwei system as the state run enterprises were increasingly unable to compete.

At the same time the role of the work unit has changed as China has moved from a socialist ideology to "Socialism with Chinese characteristics".

The political use of the danwei system in socialist China[edit]

Briefly mentioned earlier, the late nineteenth century saw a surge of "public social consciousness" which brought the public's attention to many social, political, moral, and sanitary dangers of urbanized areas.[6] So when the CCP defeated the GMD in 1949, they sought to consolidate urban rule quickly for their own interests and that of the general populations'. By 1957, over 90 percent of the urban population belonged to a danwei.[7] The danwei became as much of a social and political tool as it was an economic one. The CCP's creation of a danwei system that was based strictly on functionalism represented a break from the previous imperial China's focus on Confucian principles of hierarchy and order.[8] Thus, Danweis were themselves a product of socialist ideology but furthermore, they were "key sites" for the CCP-led government to promote their egalitarian ideology.[9] As a result of danweis being such a socially enclosed and monitored environment, people became hyperaware of their behaviour and strived for absolute conformity which gave way for the "penetration of the Leninist state in urban society."[10] Danweis became successful vessels for political mobilization as the encouraged relations between employees were founded upon and channelled into political participation, often against an enemy.[11] An example of this would be the massive workers' strikes during Mao Zedong's Hundred Flowers Campaign where in the span of 6 months between 1956 and 1957, over 10,000 strikes had occurred nationwide in favour of Chairman Mao's attack on bureaucratism.[12] More day-today-day political rituals, however, included activities like directed study of documents and collective criticism.

The disintegration of the danwei system[edit]

During the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to1976, both administrative agencies and production regulation in relation to danweis were extremely disrupted.[13] In these years, people often led double lives; praising Mao Zedong and participating in the revolution while engaging in activities that the revolution rejected such as listening to forbidden music.[14] Along with the emotional and physical devastation in China, this ultimately led to exhaustion of the labour force from endless attempted "brainwashing" in danweis.[14] In the years during China's reform era beginning in 1976 and ending in 1989, led by Deng Xiaoping, the policies surrounding the permanency of the employee to the work unit became more lax, particularly in enterprise units (qiye danwei) where there was an increasing lack of a personnel dossier (dang an) system that prevented people from transferring or quitting.[15] The danwei system only further weakened after 1978 when a market economy was put in place in lieu of a planned economy, and as the space became more heterogenous, it lost its once collective spirit and became more unstable.[13] It was in 1978 that Chinese leadership suggested private housing and in 1980, the National Urban Housing and Residence Meeting granted workers permission to build and own property, as well as buy public housing units.[16] Eventually, in 1988, the State Council stopped issuing the construction of new housing units and instead redirected those funds to support workers buying their own housing units.[16] By the time the 1990s came around, urban social identity shifted when people began to identify themselves by their individual identity cards rather than their danwei, marking the ultimate dissolution of the danwei.[17] The danwei lost its economic and social dominance in the lives of Chinese urban workers due to economic reform and changing social attitudes towards individuality and identity amidst political change.[18] By 2000 much of the work unit's power had been removed. In 2003, for example, it became possible to marry or divorce someone without needing authorization from one's work unit.[19]

The danwei system as a failed means of economic recovery[edit]

Between 1962 and 1965, during the Mao era, Beijing's leaders adopted emergency measures after the Great Leap resulted in mass starvation and agricultural downturn.[20] More than 20 million people who had settled in urban areas were forced back to the countryside to work when urban food and consumer goods were strictly rationed in the socially-controlled danweis.[21] The CCP then put into place policies that "had the effect of freezing people into their current work units."[21] This often meant that many workers had little or no knowledge of what was going on outside of their unit and there was close to no mobility between units or residences. The danwei unit system in tandem with strict residence registration requirements, namely the Hukou system, prevented migration from rural areas to urban ones, essentially dividing China into two tiers: a privileged urban society and an exploited rural society.[22] This is among the many examples of how Mao Zedong's idealistic economic and social campaigns backfired.

Background[edit]

The role of the danwei was modelled in part on the Soviet kombinat.[23]: 32  Some scholars believe that the social, economic, and political functions of the danwei could be traced back to the pre-communist financial institutions in the 1930s, the labor movement between the 1920s and 1940s, and the rural revolutionary models of organization in the Yan'an period.[2] In addition, some scholars propose that Chinese state planners borrowed heavily from the Soviet model of development, or state socialism, in the design of party and state organs as well as the management of state enterprises.[24] To accelerate the pace of industrialization and to create a new urban working class, the Chinese Communist Party looked up to the Soviet experience and translated thousands of Soviet enterprise management literature.[25] The CCP used basic principles of industrial organization and management from Soviet literature to draft its own industrial management system and create a new factory hierarchy of authority and administration. To follow the Soviet socialist economic model, which aimed to achieve full employment, the Chinese work unit system guaranteed permanent employment. This means that a factory could not easily fire its workers and the workers could not switch to another work unit unless they obtained special permissions. The physical design of danwei was also influenced by Soviet architecture.[5]: 24 

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Wu, Yiching (2014). The cultural revolution at the margins : Chinese socialism in crisis. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. p. 29. ISBN 978-0-674-41985-8. OCLC 881183403.
  2. ^ a b Lin, Kevin (2019-06-25), "Work Unit", Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi, ANU Press, doi:10.22459/acc.2019.53, ISBN 978-1-78873-476-9
  3. ^ a b Harrell, Stevan (2023). An Ecological History of Modern China. Seattle: University of Washington Press. ISBN 9780295751719.
  4. ^ a b Russo, Alessandro (2020). Cultural Revolution and Revolutionary Culture. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. p. 253. ISBN 978-1-4780-1218-4. OCLC 1156439609.
  5. ^ a b c Simpson, Tim (2023). Betting on Macau: Casino Capitalism and China's Consumer Revolution. Globalization and Community series. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 978-1-5179-0031-1.
  6. ^ Bray, David (March 5, 2005). Social Space and Governance in Urban China. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 68. ISBN 9781503624924.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  7. ^ Bray, David (March 4, 2005). Social Space and Governance in Urban China. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 94. ISBN 9781503624924.
  8. ^ Bray, David (March 4, 2005). Social Space and Governance in Urban China. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 67. ISBN 9781503624924.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  9. ^ Dutton, Michael (24 Jun 2008). "Passionately governmental: Maoism and the structured intensities of revolutionary governmentality". Postcolonial Studies. 11 (1): 106. doi:10.1080/13688790801971563 – via Routledge.
  10. ^ Dittmer, Lowell; Xiaobo, Lu (March 1996). "Personal Politics in the Chinese Danwei under Reform". Asian Survey. 36 (3): 249. doi:10.2307/2645691. JSTOR 2645691 – via JSTOR.
  11. ^ Dutton, Michael (24 Jun 2008). "Passionately governmental: Maoism and the structured intensities of revolutionary governmentality". Postcolonial Studies. 11 (1): 107. doi:10.1080/13688790801971563 – via Routledge.
  12. ^ |last1=Lü, |last2=Perry, |first1=Xiaobo, |first2=Elizabeth J. (Jul 28, 1997). The Changing Chinese Workplace in Historical and Comparative Perspective (1st ed.). Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe. p. 48. ISBN 9780765636195.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: numeric names: authors list (link)
  13. ^ a b Zhao, Qianhui; Song, Feng (29 June 2021). "XXVIII International Seminar on Urban Form ISUF2021: URBAN FORM AND THE SUSTAINABLE AND PROSPEROUS CITIES" (PDF). Strath Prints. Archived (PDF) from the original on 6 May 2022. Retrieved 29 May 2024.
  14. ^ a b Radchenko, Sergey; Torigian, Joseph; Yordanov, Radoslav; Dikötter, Frank (Spring 2019). "Chinese Society amid Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution: The Roots and Nature of the Tragedy". Journal of Cold War Studies. 21 (2): 176. doi:10.1162/jcws_c_00880 – via Project Muse.
  15. ^ Dittmer, Lowell; Xiaobo, Lu (March 1996). "Personal Politics in the Chinese Danwei under Reform". Asian Survey. 36 (3): 249. doi:10.2307/2645691. JSTOR 2645691 – via JSTOR.
  16. ^ a b Xie, Yu; Lai, Qing; Wu, Xiaogang (1 January 2009). "And social inequality in contemporary urban ChinaDanwei". National Institutes of Health. Research in the Sociology of Work. 19: 283–306. doi:10.1108/S0277-2833(2009)0000019013. ISBN 978-1-84855-730-7. PMC 2828673. PMID 20191102.
  17. ^ Bray, David (March 4, 2005). Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origins to Reform. Redwood City: Stanford University Press. p. 157. ISBN 9781503624924.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  18. ^ Bray, David (March 4, 2005). Social Space and Governance in Urban China: The Danwei System from Origins to Reform. Redwood City: Stanford University Press. p. 158. ISBN 9781503624924.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  19. ^ Hui Faye, Xiao (April 22, 2014). Family Revolution : Marital Strife in Contemporary Chinese Literature and Visual Culture. Seattle: University of Washington Press. p. 3. ISBN 978-0-295-99349-2.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: date and year (link)
  20. ^ "Great Leap Forward: What It Was, Goals, and Impact". Investopedia. Retrieved 2024-05-28.
  21. ^ a b Lieberthal, Kenneth (2004). Governing China: from Revolution Through Reform (2nd ed.). New York: Norton: Norton & Company. p. 109. ISBN 0-393-92492-0.
  22. ^ Lieberthal, Kenneth (2004). Governing China: from Revolution Through Reform (2nd ed.). New York: Norton: Norton & Company. p. 110. ISBN 0-393-92492-0.
  23. ^ Russo, Alessandro (2019). "Class Struggle". In Sorace, Christian; Franceschini, Ivan; Loubere, Nicholas (eds.). Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi. Acton, Australia: Australian National University Press. ISBN 9781760462499.
  24. ^ WALDER, ANDREW G. (2015). China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-05815-6. JSTOR j.ctvjf9wzk.
  25. ^ Kaple, Deborah A. Dream of a Red Factory: The Legacy of High Stalinism in China. Oxford University Press.

Public Domain This article incorporates text from this source, which is in the public domain. Country Studies. Federal Research Division. [1]

Bibliography[edit]

  • Bjorklund, E. M. “The Danwei: Socio-Spatial Characteristics of Work Units in China's Urban Society.” Economic Geography, vol. 62, no. 1, 1986, pp. 19–29.
  • Chai, Yanwei (2014-09-24). "From socialist danwei to new danwei: a daily-life-based framework for sustainable development in urban China". Asian Geographer.
  • "Danwei -Work Unit Urbanism | Model House". transculturalmodernism.org. Retrieved 2019-11-30.
  • Danwei : the changing Chinese workplace in historical and comparative perspective. Lü, Xiaobo, 1959-, Perry, Elizabeth J. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 1997
  • Lin, Kevin. "Work Unit.” Afterlives of Chinese Communism: Political Concepts from Mao to Xi, edited by Christian Sorace et al., ANU Press, Australia, 2019, pp. 331–334.
  • Kaple, Deborah A. (1994-01-06). Dream of a Red Factory: The Legacy of High Stalinism in China. Oxford University Press.
  • Walder, Andrew G. Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry. University of California Press, 1986.
  • Whyte, Martin King and William L. Parish. Urban Life in Contemporary China. University of Chicago Press. 1984.
  • 刘建军。《单位中国 : 社会调控体系重构中的个人, 组织与国家》。天津：天津人民出版社, 2000.
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