Talk:Moral realism

The answer to the question below is that a moral realist is not necessarily committed to the view that moral norms are 'objective' in the sense that a statement expressing that norm is universally true for all moral agents. Moral Relativists could be moral realists as well. - 27, October 2006

How is this different from moral objectivism? Could the two be merged? Canuck-Errant 10:28, 23 October 2006 (UTC)

It seems to me that much of this article is inaccurate, as there are "realist" positions that do not claim full objective status for moral claims. E.g. they may say that such claims are not relative to cultures or individuals and apply to our whole species - but may not be part of an objective reality that any rational spacies must acknowledge. Brink may be an example of someone who takes such a position, though I don't know whether he would accept that he could be described in such a way. If this distinction is drawn, the article needs revision. If the distinction is not drawn, I see no need to have two separate articles. Metamagician3000 11:16, 22 December 2006 (UTC)

This is a general problem on the Wiki pages for moral philosophy. There are many different ways of mapping and naming the available positions in ethics and we have failed to agree to a set of terms. You, like myself, grew up on subjectivists and relativists counting as "realists" and the term realism being used as part of a binary with "anti-realism." However, there is now an increasingly popular set of terms that changes the playing field. Added to the list is "irrealism," and that is where subjectivists and relativists now fall. The new paradigm is attractive in that it recognizes the gulf that separates metaethical objectivists from non-objectivists, though it is apt to cause quite a bit of confusion before the dust settles. Postmodern Beatnik 06:36, 25 May 2007 (UTC)

So, my last comment was made while I was making the switch from the old (Sayre-McCord) taxonomy to the new (Richard Joyce) taxonomy, and I must admit I did not fully grasp the changes. Regardless, the new taxonomy uses three theses to define moral realism and operates in binary with anti-realism/irrealism (they are used synonymously), and is—in my opinion—vastly superior. As it is already mostly in place both here and at moral skepticism (though I think we also need a moral anti-realism page), I suggest we make the new model of categorizing the possible positions in metaethics our official standard. We should have some sort of explanation about the terminological history somewhere, however. Any thoughts? Postmodern Beatnik (talk) 02:28, 22 April 2008 (UTC)

I confess some puzzlement about placing constructivists (who are often Kantians) like Korsgaard and Rawls (or O'Neill) in the same camp as subjectivists, or in adjoining campus, since it seems to me that constructivists would want to say that there were truth-apt moral propositions the truth of which was preference- or desire-independent--that were, in a word, objective. It seems to me that it might be useful more clearly to distinguish between moral objectivism (with a small 'o'), a position to which constructivists could clearly subscribe, and moral realism, a sub-family of objectivism, to which they couldn't. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.93.180.171 (talk) 00:08, 21 January 2008 (UTC)

I agree with the above comment; there is an extensive discussion on between myself and Postmodern Beatnik where I have tried to argue that the classifications used here on in the meta-ethics article falsely group both Richard Hare and ethical constructivists with those who believe that there are no objective values. This is a complete misrepresentation of their views. Korsgaard has also argued that positions like hers should be called "procedural realism", which would also arguably include the general views of pragmatists like CS Peice on truth (both scientific and moral), so I don't even think we should concede the word "realism" to only include non-constructivist views. What a few people are calling "realism" here represents only one specific view about what reality is; whether they are right or not, we can't permit a wikipedia article to assume that they are, and to make incorrect inferences about how to characterize contrary positions based on the assumption that this particular view is right.

Indeed, Korsgaard isn't even a non-realist under the strict definitions given in the article; she would agree to all three of the theses listed below. Hare is not one only because he doesn't think that ordinary moral statements are truth-apt; but he insists that there are strict logical criteria for their proper expression, and even that we can be *at least* as certain about the criteria of right or wrong assertions of moral claims as we can about scientific ones (see his article in Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Mark Timmons on this point). Hence he certainly thinks there are objective values, and therefore would be a moral realist according the first sentence of the present wikipedia article, suggesting some confusion in the article about what the concept of "moral realism" is trying to get at.--ScottForschler (talk) 13:26, 20 June 2008 (UTC)

I edited the page to classify Hare, Rawls, and Korsgaard as possible realists. If anyone disagrees, I will ask you to suggest a rewriting of the article's multiple definitions of realism, as (1) commitment to objective values, and (2) commitment to 2 or 3 of the theses listed in the middle. Korsgaard agrees with all three theses; Hare disagrees with thesis 2, but agrees with the others, and also believes in objective values; Rawls I'm less certain about, in part because he disclaimed the attempt to provide a complete moral theory, but was clearly confident that certain results of his constructivist procedure were robustly true moral statements.

Incidentally, I don't understand why this line

The change of relativistic morals over time is called the "Zeitgeist".

is at the bottom of the opening section. It doesn't seem related to the rest. Can anyone elaborate it or defend its placement, or should we remove it?--ScottForschler (talk) 17:21, 21 June 2008 (UTC)

Murder Imports Wrongness

I object to the illustrative example using the proposition "murder is wrong" to illustrate moral realism. The definition of the word "murder" is "a wrongful killing." This exposes the difficulty with many discussions of moral facts: the definitions for moral facts tend to be circular in nature. Definitions for ordinary facts (like "It is raining") do not tend to have this problem of circularity. If somebody chooses to take on a rewrite of this article I would hope that they could strive to eliminate circular definitions and other problematic discussions within this article.

1) Realists can supply arguments like "murder is wrong because it causes unnecessary suffering".

2) Relativists might agree that murder is wrong but be unable to explain why.

3) Denying that murder is in fact wrong is not relativism, it is nihilism or error theory.

1Z 02:41, 24 May 2007 (UTC)

in regards to your point number three, denying that murder is wrong isn't REALLY nihilism, it's just bad grammar. saying that "wrongful killing isn't wrong" is sort of a grammatical and linguistic issue. a better example would be to say that someone might hold the belief that killing isn't wrong, and that murder therefore doesn't exist as a concept except in people's imaginations.

It might be, although I think that is a minor point.1Z 18:22, 3 June 2007 (UTC)

Robust/Minimal Moral Realism

I have just added a section on the difference between the robust model of moral realism and the minimal model of moral realism. My main problem with it is the formatting of the quote from Pekka Väyrynen. I used a template suggested by WP:MOS, but I am unsure it was the most appropriate way to address the formatting issue. Postmodern Beatnik (talk) 18:16, 1 May 2008 (UTC)

This distinction is part of a larger project I am undertaking, regarding disambiguating the terms moral realism, moral objectivism, moral universalism, moral absolutism, and moral relativism. I have started a discussion about this at Talk:Meta-ethics#More_extensive_reorganization; please come by and contribute your thoughts there. -Pfhorrest (talk) 22:56, 4 October 2008 (UTC)

Religion

It appears that moral realism is closely related to Judeo-Christian ethics and religion in general. It seems noteworthy but should likely be argued further. ADM (talk) 13:30, 20 January 2009 (UTC)

Unclear why you think this; religion is only one possible source of moral facts, and hardly the most stable one (indeed, the Meta-ethics article suggests, plausibly, that the divine command theory is really a subjectivist view, in which moral statements only express the whims of a divine being rather than robust facts). There are many other, more robust, forms of moral realism. --ScottForschler (talk) 01:14, 24 February 2010 (UTC)

The Abolition of Man

C. S. Lewis's The Abolition of Man is the definitive book that argues for the correctness of moral realism. It's impact has been profound and it probably deserves mention in the article somewhere. --BenMcLean (talk) 19:01, 17 December 2009 (UTC)

It's hardly "the definitive book," for it argues for a very specific form of natural law (or intuitionist) theory of "self-evident" moral absolutes; this is only one specific, and a highly contentious, form of moral realism instead of any "definitive" version thereof. --ScottForschler (talk) 01:15, 24 February 2010 (UTC)

What are the other kinds then? --BenMcLean (talk) 22:15, 1 March 2010 (UTC)

Merge "Moral realism" with "Natural law"

I think these two articles describe the same concept. --BenMcLean (talk) 19:04, 17 December 2009 (UTC)

Oppose. They're definitely related concepts but I think they're distinct enough to warrant separate articles. For example, Aquinas was a natural law proponent but would not be considered a moral realist by the "robust" definition used in this article. --Pfhorrest (talk) 22:32, 17 December 2009 (UTC)

Comment I don't know anything about moral realism, but I think that post-Enlightenment the term "natural law" generally refers to science, and have proposed here to move natural law to philosophy of natural law and redirect the natural law article to science. Jeremy (talk) 21:09, 28 December 2009 (UTC)

"Comment" I thoroughly oppose the merging of the Moral realism and Natural law articles. They discuss closely related topics but are most definitely distinct. A moral realist, as discussed above, can also be relativist, in contrast to a natural law which is incompatible with relativism.

Relativism isn't compatible with moral realism ... what are you talking about? How can relativism, the doctrine that all ethical propositions are subjective, be compatible with the notion that ethical propositions are made true by objective features of the world? These two ideas seem to me to be exact polar opposites, where each is the refutation and rejection of the other. --BenMcLean (talk) 22:19, 1 March 2010 (UTC)

Oppose: Moral Realism is a position taken in discussions about morality (and is opposed to things like moral constructivism or relativism, which state various forms of the argument that morality is a social/human construct), while the Natural Law tradition is concerned with the notion that there are some laws inherent in (human) nature that positive law should cohere with, and is inferior to. You can take any of the former positions WRT Natural Law thinking. i.e., you can believe that Natural laws are guaranteed by God, the gods, human nature, society, Nature, etc., but this is a different discussion.boombaard (talk) 11:02, 2 January 2010 (UTC)

Oppose: The expression "Natural law" has since several centuries a very specific meaning and has precise counterparts in other languages, such as in German language where it is called "Naturrecht". The term, therefore, should not be intermingled with a more general expression like "Moral realism".-- Ziegenspeck (talk) 10:58, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

I suggest that it would be more appropriate to consider the merging of naturalist philosophy and natural law. Naturalist philosophy defines ethical terms with natural properties and this is a parallel to natural law which tries to define legal terms and origins by appealing to nature. However even this parallel has shortcomings - Bentham is a moral naturalist, but opposes natural law. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 217.42.225.63 (talk) 13:04, 29 December 2009 (UTC)

Odd objection

Section Criticism is unsourced by inline references. Among others the following "criticism" seems very odd to me:

The first is that, while realism can explain how to resolve moral conflicts, it cannot explain how these conflicts arose in the first place.

Which is not needed. If empirically, a certain kind of conflicts occur, and then a counter-measure strategy is proved effective, such as by socio-biological statistics, then we have a proper explanation of the counter-measure. Why is the lack of answer to a partially or totally irrelevant question a proper criticism? Is the objection sourceable, or am I correct in suspecting that the statement is not sourceable because it is a miscomprehension (or similar)? The entire Criticism section needs proper inline references, and unvaguing so that all statements are attributed to sources. Rursus dixit. (^mbork³!) 15:12, 2 February 2010 (UTC)

I am not really acquainted with wikipedia guidelines for quotations, so I am just going to mention it in this discussion page : among others John Mackie, In Ethics : Inventing Right and Wrong (Part 1, chap. 1, section 8 : the argument from relativity) famously formed such an argument that relativity of morals in societies constitutes an argument against moral realism insofar as moral scepticism is a more probable answer to moral disagreement that moral realism, especially if it is to be grounded on a natural intuition or "moral sense".

--88.162.121.155 (talk) 01:39, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

Ah, that does make some sense -- an intuitionist, non-naturalist form of moral realism (such as Moore's) is vulnerable to attack by appeal to cultural differences in moral intuitions. (Compare, for example, how empiricism [about non-moral issues] would be vulnerable to broad and persistent differences in observations of the natural world, if such existed; e.g. if the Chinese measured the pull of gravity as a different value than the British). Could you be so kind as to provide Mackie's exact words so that we can quote him to back up that criticism? Thanks. --Pfhorrest (talk) 06:26, 22 March 2010 (UTC)

Glad to. "The actual variations in the moral codes are more readily explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly distorted, of objective values", is, I think, the most adequate quote concerning this question. 88.162.121.155 (talk) 19:26, 24 March 2010 (UTC)

That helps a bunch. I've added it to the article. Thanks! --Pfhorrest (talk) 22:01, 24 March 2010 (UTC)

Conversation with Peter Railton

There is a video conversation between Peter Railton and Don Loeb about moral realism that lasts about an hour on http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/13443 Does anyone think that it would be inappropriate to add this as an external link to the article, or contradict with wikipedia rules? cihan (talk) 02:40, 12 August 2010 (UTC)

Added Science section

I added a section on scientific views related to moral realism. Several scientists and science writers argue that it is possible to ground ethics in physical reality and processes.--Babank (talk) 22:22, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

"Science and moral realism" is horrid

For one, "scientific realism" at the top of the category is completely unrelated to moral realism which is a bad sign in itself, second the content within is not discussed by philosophers of moral realism and it therefore of little worth. It doesn't include the very few times that science has had implications for moral realism, e.g. the evolutionary argument put forward by Street. I've edited the article to remove the section but may begin work on arguments for moral realism/criticism in order to include the evolutionary argument, etc. -- Ollyoxenfree (talk) 23:27, 20 April 2016 (UTC)

This article has been botched, and I'm afraid this is another example. Richard Boyd is the strongest proponent of scientific and moral realism, and the originator of Cornell Realism. In every sense, moral and scientific realism are the same thing in this view. And it is a terrible mistake that Boyd's "How To Be A Moral Realist" (which, according to Boyd, could just as well be called "how to be a scientific realist") has been left out of here. He's produced dozens of papers, and steadily over the years, people have adopted versions of it. And even this year's Popper Prize (BJP) went to a paper detailing an elaboration of this theory. I'd also add Philip Kitcher (John Dewey Professor at Columbia) to this article. Qphilo (talk) 00:16, 17 January 2017 (UTC)

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Please return my referrence lacking addition

The demand of accecibility is of common knowledge in the field, and so the right solution is to bring back my contribution while noting that a source is required. Amir Segev Sarusi (talk) 09:09, 1 December 2019 (UTC)

"Moral Platonism"

Moral platonism is a kind of moral realism, but the lede to this article falsely equates them. I'd wager that most moral realists are not well-described as moral platonists. The source for the alternative name is Shafer-Landau's collection Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10, which, I checked, does indeed have a discussion of and argument moral platonism - that makes very clear that moral platonism is only a subset of (non-naturalist) moral realism. Naturalist moral realism, as well as various kinds of non-platonistic non-naturalisms, are not moral platonism. I've edited out the "moral Platonism" part of the lede (as well as the reference, whose entire purpose seems to be trying to establish that moral realism is also known as moral platonism - which, I emphasize, is neither supported by the reference nor true). Tikallisti (talk) 09:54, 5 November 2020 (UTC)

"of the world"

In this edit User:Dellagostino deleted the phrase "of the world" from the short description which read (mirroring the lede) "...ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world". His edit summary was: 'Position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world' implies that such features are natural, when moral realism applies to divine command theory and other worldly phenomena. similar to mathematical propositions, moral facts are true or false independent of any particular world."

In this edit I reverted that with the edit summary divine command theory isn't a form of the robust moral realism this article is about, it's just a kind of moral universalism; similarly, other universalist views like non-descriptive cognitivism are not "realist" in this sense because they don't take moral claims to describe facts about the world

He emailed me about that, being new here and not understanding talk pages, and with his permission I'm reproducing his email and responding to it here:

Hey Forrest. I believe that your aligning moral realism with facts about the world is a mischaracterization of moral realism, namely that there are moral facts, which makes no claim about the world. Among other sources, see:

https://iep.utm.edu/moralrea/

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/

Whatever else the Wikipedia article is about, the title is Moral Realism and I encourage you to either update the article title or your account of the concept.

For the sake of discussion, universal or not, divine command theory is an example of moral realism from which moral facts are not about or derived from the world.

As you see in the first subsection of the article, there are (at least) two different senses of the term "moral realism", one of them "robust" and one of them "minimal". Because the "minimal" sense is also synonymous with the term "moral universalism", we've made this article all about the "robust" sense, and left the article Moral universalism to discuss the "minimal" sense. Divine command theory is an example of a theory (along with ideal observer theory, universal prescriptivism, non-descriptive cognitivism, etc) that is "realist" in the "minimal" sense, but not in the "robust" sense that this article is about. --Pfhorrest (talk) 21:57, 6 March 2021 (UTC)