Talk:Scientific method/Archive 7

Simple-minded Syntax Questions

P0M: The sentence: "In the 17th century Francis Bacon described rationale for establishing causation between phenomena," is incorrect. Is it supposed to be "described rationales" or "described a rationale"?

probably 'a rationale'. But I would avoid rationale altogether. I understand Bacon to have been trying to explain how truth may be obtained from the natural world and describing the procedure / method to follow to do so. I see it more or less operationally, in service of developing new knowledge of a particular kind. ww

P0M: Have I lost my ability to write idiomatic English? Or is the following sentence wrong too? "It is common to speak as if a single approach such as Roger Bacon's were how scientists operate all the time." Simple subject: approach Verb: were -- By my lights that should be: "approach was" or "approaches were".

This one could be somebody trying to use the subjunctive, which is no longer used except in rare circumstances in modern English (compare with If I were you instead of If I was you -- the subjunctive is used to describe situations contrary to fact). It should be changed as an awkward construction unusual in modern English, but the if clause makes it borderline acceptable, if one wanted to be pedantic. Tuf-Kat

I read it thus, "it's common to speak as if <such and such> were how scientists ..." It seems to be not very common phrasing, and thus perhaps confusing, but precise and so acceptable. ww

Defense of the subjunctive even if common speakers of English were no longer to use the subjunctive, it would be a great loss to discourage its use, as it allows statements which would be incomprehensible without this mode. Please do not use the argument that it is unfashionable, because we are trying to write about a subtle subject, which requires all the power of the language we have available to speak about it - namely English

P0M: The paragraph beginning, "In other cases, it is 'mathematical simplicity," is structurally pretty haphazard. It occasionally leaves me guessing what the author is trying to convey.

This was mine. The intent was to discuss various sorts of simplicty (in an elegance / beauty of hypothesis context) and to note that 'simplicity' changes as new results (or new hypotheses) become available. All, of course, in the face of an obligation to account for the phenomena a la Occam. This is a Wiki -- have at it yourself! In this case anyway, I've (hopefully) helped with the intent. ww

P0M: The following collection of words is not a sentence: "If results contradictory to the predictions are found, the hypothesis under test is either wrong (requiring revision or abandonment)." either wrong or what???

My guess is something like, '... or the experiment/observation which produced the results has been misunderstood or badly carried out. More work may need to be done.' ww

P0M: Sorry to be so picky, but here is another one: " The Quine-Duhem thesis claims that any theory can be made compatible with any empirical observation by the addition of suitable ad hoc hypothesis." It's either "addition of suitable hypotheses" or "addition of a suitable hypothesis." Also, the well-informed general reader is highly unlikely to know who Quine and Duhem are, what their qualifications for proposing a "thesis" are, etc. The Splivengates-Splavendorst principle holds exactly the opposite, as all Fubarians know perfectly well. ;-)

Surely, as to number agreement. But... Slivengates-Splavendorst principle??? Fubarian I understand I think, unless snafu'd .... ww

POM, Why not just fix these 'Simple-minded Syntax Questions'? Thanks for pointing out my error re: hypothesis/ese Banno 21:22, 15 Jan 2004 (UTC)

P0M: I'll fix what I can, but there are a couple of things that are so murky that I don't think I'll have much chance for setting them the way they should be.

Because this subject deals with knowledge and how we know what we know (or think we know) and further because science (and its methods) appear to be different in their operation than from say theology, art history, or philosophy, there is some controversy on how it is that science proceeds, and whether that proceeding is what makes for its specialness among the things that we humans do. Hence most, or at least some, of the murk.

There has been, since C S Peirce (the first to say it clearly as far as I know), a view that science is different because of its different_than_other_human_enterprises approach to things. And further that that different approach can be identified as a process / procedure / method. Popper in the last century was the most prominent proponent of this view and he claimed the difference to be the fundamentally falsificationist approach science (and scientists) had been using in practice, with or without a clear statement of it. That view has wide support among scientists and observers of science.

In opposition to this view (regardless of minor variations), there has arisen (largely since WWII) the view that what scientists do is little or no different from what art historians or theologians do. At least not in principle. That scientists are persistently concerned with experiments and data and consistency among observations regardless of origin, and that art historians and theologians are not, is not especially significant for this view. Science, like everything, is a social construction and depends (entirely or mostly or significantly) on the history (personal, psychological, political, economic, linguistic, ...) of the idividuals who do science and, in the extreme, of those watch what they do. There is a commonality here with other recent intellectual / literary / psychological / historical / philosophical / linguistic trends (eg, deconstruction, post modernism, ...) which also take the position that content is, in an important sense, less significant than history and position of observer (and perhaps the same in re: the creator -- note the lower case here). This movement, being avant garde / revolutionary / opposed to orthodoxy, is fascinating to some, and seems to appear to some of those to have a handle on a universal (or at least widely applicable) explanatory method / technique / approach. I personally think that, in regard to science, it also has the advantage of avoiding much necessity to actually confront the difficult grounding (math, data, existing theoretical structure, ...) required if one is to grapple with the sugject matter the scientists claim to be talking about. The discussion moves from content to approach / history / observer perspective / use of language, which doesn't require so much mastery of content. But this may very well be a personal nit.

This article currently reflects considerable tension between these two views. There has been editing back and forth. Some has been extreme (see the archives of this talk page or the page history) and some has been less so. The less extreme has had the practical (whether deliberate or not) effect of subtling recasting the wording of the article to support (broadly) one or the other view. That there are numerous details in the weeds is true, but not very important with regard to this point. I will give a relatively minor example. At some point the terms of the discussion were changed to cast the first view above as a description of an 'idealised scientific method' used to instruct scientists and students. Further on, it was noted that philosophers regard this as inadequate. Actually, quite a few folks including philosophers, regard the Peirce / Popper account of scientific method as the most reasonable account of just what is done and quite a few of them agree with Popper that science is what proceeds that way and anything that doesn't isn't science. Valuable and helpful and perhaps even true, but not science. It isn't, to those folks, an 'idealised description' suitable only for the pedagogy of students and other philosophical hoi polloi. Describing it as such distorts the position / understanding of a quite large group. That they are, on average perhaps, less philosophically sophisticated than others doesn't seem overly significant for the purposes of this article.

Therefore, much of the murk and muddle you see is due to a mixture of views, overlaid in a messy way, and sometimes in a confusing and 'sneaky pleading' way. Some of the muddle is due to the real philosophical problems -- dating back to Plato or before -- of discerning what is actually going on, what is truth, and how to tell. That part is probably inevitable.

You seem to have a clear sense of ordinary expository language, if not the philosophical pitfalls in the use of it or the deconstructionist implications thereof, and I would encourage you to simply go ahead and clean up whatever you think is unclear in that respect. Just as you have begun to do. The partisans of this or that philosophical account of the underlying content should, in my view, get out of your way. Clarity has a consdierable virtue of its own, even if it is only of ordinary expository language. This is not a specialist philosophical encyclopedia and clarity should be important. ww 21 Jan 2004

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null hypothesis

Why in all this banter about the scientific method have I not seen anything about it's core - "disproving the null hypothesis"? TimothyPilgrim 13:15, 22 Dec 2004 (ETC)

I suspect that what you are referring to is falsifiability – and it is mentioned. Banno 20:42, 22 Jan 2004 (UTC)

Right, but the term is not apparent on this page. Being a basic part of the method, I would think it appropriate to include it here. There is a separate null hypothesis page, but I notice that no page with the word science in the title links to it. It came up frequently in my own studies. I'm just surprised no one has included it yet. TimothyPilgrim 21:34, 22 Dec 2004 (ETC)

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See also

I suggest that this section simply be subsumed into the annotated list... Banno 05:52, 9 Feb 2004 (UTC)

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NPOV

There has been little significant discussion or editing of the content of this article since the NPOV banner was added. Would I be right in assuming the dispute is now over? Banno 20:07, 15 Mar 2004 (UTC)

No. I have not significantly contributed from a sense of frustration and an unwillingness to start/prolong an edit war. The NPOV I noted has not changed. I think the banner should remain. ww

"Traditional" description of scientific method

Hello. The current revision of the article states "The essential elements of the scientific method are traditionally described as follows:" and then it goes on to list Observe, Hypothesize, Test, etc. I agree that this is "traditional" in the sense that this is standard-issue stuff that has been taught in schools for decades -- since at least the 70's (my jr high science class) and doubtless much earlier. I'm curious to know when that list of items became mainstream. I'm guessing not earlier than maybe the 50's, when public education might have caught up with the stuff the Vienna Circle was doing in the 20's. Does anyone know when the current mainstream view of scientific method became "traditional"? And what, if anything, was taught as scientific method before that? I'm all ears. Regards, Wile E. Heresiarch 16:36, 29 Mar 2004 (UTC)

WEH, I expect that the intent of the phrasing here is meant to refer to the Popperian 'orthodoxy' as it trickled down to elementary and secondary schools. CS Peirce had made similar observations before the turn of the century, but Popper's became important after he moved to the UK getting out of the way of the Hitler onslaught. PB Medawar's "autobiography" (A Thinking Radish) and others of his writing (notably several of the essays in Pluto's Republic) deal intermittently with Popper personally, and with his academic/philosophic influence in the pre-War period. Medawar has the virtues of scientific background (Nobel in Biology), a wide perspective (born in Brazil, degrees from Oxford, importance in academia and in research administration) and perhaps most importantly, a gloriously clear and engaging writing style. Worth reading simply for himself; he and his wife even managed to write a dictionary/glossary page turner. Not your average scientist, writer, or thinker.

As for when such ideas trickled down, that would depend on where your school was and how alert the curriculum was. I personally got a dose of Bacon and straight induction in junior high school somewhat before your ordeal. Not a trace of Popper and certainly not of Peirce. On the other hand, by 1970, I was well aware of Popperian orthodoxy, probably from independent reading, as I don't recall anything about "this being due to Popper". I expect that others had a different and, I would hope, better experience.

On the presentation in this article, the 'traditional' ascription is, as nearly as I can tell, meant more to contrast with more 'up to date' philosophy in this regard (as from Lakatos and Feyerabent and 'critical theory' generally) than to take a position on what has been taught in lower schools and when that particular teaching began or ended. It is not what I was taught (in re Baconian induction) nor, quite, Popperian either. This particular point may or may not be quite apposite your query, however.

ww 17:16, 29 Mar 2004 (UTC)

NPOV, again

(William M. Connolley 19:53, 2004 Mar 29 (UTC)) Its not clear from the above talk exactly which bits are considered NPOV. I'm guessing its "Kuhn, Feyerabend, Quine and Popper" and so on.

I would say that from "Philosophical Issues... the material presented below is a brief introduction to some concepts in the Philosophy of science," on, there is too much material. If its an intro to phil of sci, its getting bloated. Much of it should be slimmed down, with excess moved into Phil of Sci, or removed, if it duplicates waht is there already.

Also, the article needs to distinguish far more clearly between scientifc method (as used by practicing scientists) and scientifc method (as discussed by philosophers). The two are very different.

One might equally stridently say that there is simply too much material detailing the “Idealized” method, much of which is reproduced elsewhere.

(William M. Connolley 10:37, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) One might say it. It would be more convincing if one pointed to where this elsewhere is. Please do.

Leaving out "strident" would have been nice.

Historically the pattern with this article has been that the philosophical material is removed, argument ensues, and the material is re-instated. Reducing the size of the philosophy section is the first part in a new cycle of this process. I don’t think it is an answer – and will certainly object.

(William M. Connolley 10:37, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) You don't address my point. The philospohy section claims to be an intro to philosophy of sci. Why isn't the material a brief summary of whats on the phil-of-sci article?

Furthermore, distinguishing between “scientific method (as used by practicing scientists) and scientific method (as discussed by philosophers)” simply begs the question. The point is that the philosophers – rightly or wrongly – claim to be discussing the method as used by “practical” scientists, yet the philosophers claim that the stories scientists tell each other don't work.

(William M. Connolley 10:37, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) I doubt all that. If the stoires we tell didn't work, science wouldn't work, and planes would fall out of the sky. They don't.

Rather, the article needs to articulate the NPOV issue. That is, we should work out as best we can exactly what the issue is, and present it as a part of the article. This has been done with other articles that are in conflict.

(William M. Connolley 10:37, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) Yes indeed. Thats what I'm trying to discover. But its not in the article and if its in the talk its archived.

point of fact, the philosophy section is better supported, in that it clearly sets out the parentage of the ideas presented.

(William M. Connolley 10:37, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) It refers to peoples ideas but not to where those ideas are presented. It wouldn't meet the citations standards for a scientific paper.

The “idealized” method section does not say whose argument it is presenting, instead making reference to “tradition” – surely unacceptable in an encyclopedia. Perhaps the best way to proceed would be for the supporters of this “tradition” to be named. Banno 00:34, 30 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Referring to tradition is acceptable if it is not disputed. *Are* you disputing that this is the traditional/popular view of sci method?

I've just found this page and was wondering if someone could summarize in 3 sentences what's the source of the NPOV dispute here. Once that's cleared up for me, I've got some comments about how the idealized scientific method as taught in middle school isn't actually used in all of the natural sciences, but that debate can wait until I understand the current one.  :) --zandperl 04:23, 30 Mar 2004 (UTC)

So we’re off into another debate. Shame, really, since going over this dispute again won’t really help to improve the article.

Zandperl, it was I who placed the NPOV dispute banner on the article. I did so in response to comments by WW. He claimed that the addition of the philosophy section made the article POV. My aim in adding the banner was simply to draw attention to Ww’s claim of bias.

Banno, I've just noticed this. Sorry to have missed it when posted. In fact, I was not claiming the inclusion of the 'philosophy section' was NPOV. My actual comment which caused your addition of the banner can be found above, but my view can be summarized (crudely) as follows: the NPOV I observe lies in assorted statements that the Peirce/Popperian account is unacceptable/untenable/simplistic/suitable only for elementary school pedagogy/without credible support/taken seriously only by the philosophically ignorant and naive/(< NB: I'm agnostic on the exact phrase, so most any will do>), and in asides and implications to that effect. An NPOV article would note conflicting positions without saying or suggesting that any account is true, or the only acceptable, or ..., and perhaps even noting whether one or the other was dominant among this or that group (though this later may be too hard to do without acrimony). ww 16:31, 31 Mar 2004 (UTC)

The section was added because without it, the article provides only a single perspective on the scientific method. Thus, without the philosophy section, the article is POV.

Perhaps it would help if I state my personal POV. I share the belief that science is in some way special – as William points out, science does work. But I think that the criticisms by Kuhn, Feyerabend et al of the accounts of how science works are telling. What this means is that although science is special, it is not special because it adheres to some particular method.

I also think that Kuhn and Feyerabend are wrong in supposing that scientific “paradigms” are incommensurable. I suspect – and have argued in other forums – that it is possible to make comparisons between paradigms in a way that they both think impossible. I will not argue that case here, simply because it is my point of view. But if anyone can find a scholar that articulates these arguments, I’d love to see it presented here.

As it stands, I would not describe the article as biased. It presents the “idealized” account, and it presents the well-known difficulties with that account. I do think that the article is disjointed. I also think some of the material is poorly written, but I won’t argue such stylistic points for now.

The only way forward that I can see is to articulate the debate being had here within the article itself. Ww comes close to doing this in his response to POM, (unfortunately undated). Something along these lines, as an intro to the article, would be most welcome.Going over the same argument again will serve no purpose. Banno 12:14, 30 Mar 2004 (UTC)

My reply to POM is now dated. The information was taken from the page history listing. Hadn't realized it would become a problem. ww 15:02, 30 Mar 2004 (UTC)

So I’m not accused of not responding, here is my reply to William’s reply to my reply to what he said. Forgive me for not keeping it within the thread –I have an aversion to such call-and-answer writing. My point, in arguing the case for a reduction in the scientific_method#The_idealized_scientific_method section was rhetorical.

(William M. Connolley 13:24, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) Hmmm... none too happy with that. Lets leave the rhetoric out of it. What you actually said was, it replicated material elsewhere: I guess you are now saying that isn't so.

The point is simply that the reasons you give for reducing scientific_method#Philosophical_Issues can be applied equally to that section.

No.

scientific_method#Philosophical_Issues is not intended as an introduction to philosophy of science,

(William M. Connolley 13:24, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) In that case, perhaps it would be a good idea if it didn't say the material presented below is a brief introduction to some concepts in the Philosophy of science

but as it says, it “is intended to show that some of the issues surrounding the scientific method are neither straightforward nor simple”. That is, it is there in order to show that some people do not agree with the account given elsewhere in the article.

(William M. Connolley 13:24, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) The idea that some of the issues are not simple, from a philosophical POV, is uncontroversial: it doesn't need the length it has.

Let me repeat that I agree with you that science works. But that does not mean that the stories that scientists tell each other about what they do (their descriptions of scientific method) are either valid or accurate.

(William M. Connolley 13:24, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) "stories" is the philospohers term. Scientists, in general, don't talk to each other about the sci meth - they talk about the science they are doing. What you are presenting is very much the philosphers POV.

For the most part the material in scientific_method#The_idealized_scientific_method was developed by philosophers, not working scientists. I’m sure all here would agree that it is as open to criticism as any other philosophical position. Let’s hope that the scientists working on this article are willing to accept such criticism, in the spirit that it is a possibly inaccurate description of science, not of science itself.

Restating, descriptions of scientific method are theories about science, not science itself. So to criticise a theory of scientific method is not the same as criticising science itself.

Can I congratulate all involved here in not leaping into an edit war, and suggest that we refrain form editing the article until we reach some sort of understanding in the talk pages? Banno 12:57, 30 Mar 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 13:24, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) I'm going to make some changes though...

Firstly, I do hold that the much of the material at scientific_method#The_idealized_scientific_method is present elsewhere in the encyclopaedia. Three of the main points have their own article, for heaven’s sake.

(William M. Connolley 18:10, 2004 Mar 31 (UTC)) Which are they, BTW? They don't seem to be linked to the corresponding articles.

But I do not intend to push the issue unless this is used as an excuse for reducing the Phil section. Secondly, as I have stated quite clearly, I agree with you that the idealized scientific method is a philosophical theory, not a scientific one. As you quote, To speak to another with consideration, to appear before him with decency and humility, is to honour him; as signs of fear to offend. To speak to him rashly, to do anything before him obscenely, slovenly, impudently is to dishonour. Let’s work together to improve the article, and avoid a debasing edit war.

It is unacceptable to edit the article in such a way that the philosophical difficulties with the idealized method are not presented in a forthright and clear fashion. Otherwise, edit away.

Let’s have an answer to Zandperl’s question – why is the article considered to be POV?

Ww, thanks for dating the entry. Banno 20:23, 30 Mar 2004 (UTC)

In other cases, it is 'mathematical simplicity'.

(William M. Connolley 21:33, 2004 Mar 30 (UTC)) I have removed this para, except for its header. Because its wrong. For the reasons given below. A better example by far would be the various lorentz-fitzgerald type mods to ether, vs spec rel.

WMC, I considered using, and rejected, Lorentz-Fitzgerald on the grounds of greater opacity to the general reader. The Maxwell example fit with an another example regarding light as particle vs light as wave, and so I went with it. Though, of course, few general readers will have the maths to handle the DE's involved. At least Maxwell's equations -- if looked up -- are short and sweet (even if not as clearly understandable as the perfect example ought to have been). I also considered, and rejected, pressure vessel theory, which substantially reduced boiler explosions after it was finally gotten more or less right (in the late 1800s). Also too long and complex an explanation. If you can make L-F contraction proud in this context and for these purposes, I would applaud loudly! I think I agree it's conceptually cleaner in some senses, but I thought harder to use here. ww 15:07, 31 Mar 2004 (UTC)

For example, about 1860 James Maxwell developed a mathematically quite elegant, and structually simple, account of electromagnetic radiation (light, X-rays, radio, radar, ...) which involved dual magnetic and electric fields and their interactions. It was surely less simple in many ways than the earlier widely accepted account of vibrations of the ether 'carrying' electromagnetic radiation.

This is historically wrong. Maxwells eqs coexisted with ether. Ether was the carrier for electro-mag, until the idea of a carrier was abandoned.

WMC, It is my memory (now somewhat vague after all these years) that Maxwell's model/equations did not require the ether, being agnostic as to a carrier. I recall that his own formulation was not long used having been recast by someone else, but this alternative maths form makes/made no difference as nearly as I can make out. Coexistence would not then be the issue for this example, just simpler versus more complex. Coexistence would be, I guess, a sort of complexity. ww 14:58, 31 Mar 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 18:10, 2004 Mar 31 (UTC)) My recollection was that Maxwell originally had in mind a mechanical theory: the field was to be carried by interactions between particles. Then it became clear that the theory was agnostic as to carrier, as you say.

But one feature of M's eqs was, of course, the (constant) c popping out. Then, given the eqs, you have to ask: how should this be interpreted. Einstein interpreted it as: vel is c in vacuum for all obs. At the time, it was more natural to assume that the eqs should be interpreted as describing the motion of light in the absolute rest frame defined by the eather; thus M's eqs not only coexisted withn aether they were to some extent seen as supporting it.

WMC, As to hypoth complexity here, the additional assumption of the aether (however natural at the time) was more complex. 'Raw Maxwell' was simpler hypoth, hence the use here, though it was irrestible (=natural, I suppose) to interpret it in a way which conserved existing hypoth (ie, aether). Just more complex to do so, and so a violation of the 'simpler is better' thing. ww 19:21, 31 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Unfortunately for the simpler luminiferous ether theory, the Michelson-Morley experiment of 1887 made any account including both the ether and their experimental results more complicated still. Their work made the idea of an ether whose vibrations 'were' the waves observed in connection with light so questionable that it was eventually abandoned.

Ether was only really abandoned when spec rel rendered it redundant.

WMC, The point in this extract is to make clear the increased complication, not to note when ehter was finally abandoned. ww 14:58, 31 Mar 2004 (UTC)

OK, but it has to be correct too: not just easy to understand :-)

WMC, Just so! Even Rudyard would agree, surely. ww 19:21, 31 Mar 2004 (UTC)

Both experimenters continued for some decades to ponder the problem in an attempt to reconcile their result with the existence of the ether; neither they nor anyone else has succeeded.

Ernst Mach may have been the first to explicitly abandon the ether as a consequence of that experiment. Maxwell's hypothesis became, rather quickly, the simplest available account. With modifications required by Einstein's Relativity, it still is within its range of coverage. Quantum mechanics has added a good bit since Einstein.

I don't think maxwell requires any mods for relativity. Certainly not for spec rel: it was designed to fit maxwell, after all.

WMC, GR was intended here. Perhaps that should be made explicit. ww 14:58, 31 Mar 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 18:10, 2004 Mar 31 (UTC)) I'm not at all sure Maxwell requires mods for GR either.

WMC, Well, I'm getting into waters I've not trod for many years... but, the curvature of spacetime (ie, in re: geodesics) does alter many aspects of EM behavior (eg, observable bending in the presence of a sufficiently intense grav field, to wit Eddington's expedition in 1918(?)), and assorted frequency/wavelength/energy issues (eg, red shifting in a sufficiently intense grav field), and so on. These are GR issues, thus my comment that plain Maxwell no longer sufficed. In fact, I had in mind the parallel with plain Newton no longer sufficing, post Einstein, as no longer 'conserving the phenomena'. ww 19:21, 31 Mar 2004 (UTC)

(William M. Connolley 19:33, 2004 Mar 31 (UTC)) I'm wobbly on this too so I won't push it too hard, but I'm pretty sure light still travels in straight lines even under GR, once you use the right definition of straight - ie geodesics. Locally, gravity is fully equivalent to acceleration, and maxwells eqs are not fundamentally altered by the presence of acc.

Too many ':'. We'll be wobbling together then. I stopped at PDE's and that was long ago. I hold no tenacious brief for this paragraph. I used the example only because it was connected with another here, and had a relatively clean (or so I thought!) continuation in the M-M experiment and the consequent ditching of the aether (do you people over there actually spell it that way?!) and thus made the simplicity of hypoth point clearly and rather briefly, if I may claim it. Anything which makes the same points for the reader would be acceptable to me. In short, unlike what Gen Grant is supposed to have said but actually didn't, I'll not 'stand on this line all summer'. I thought it a pretty neat solution to the expository problem I faced... Ah well, the best laid plans and so on. Suggest an alternative, will you? ww 19:51, 31 Mar 2004 (UTC)